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Abstract: Transaction-level modeling with SystemC has been very successful in describing the
behavior of embedded systems by providing high-level executable models, in which many of them
have an inherent probabilistic behavior, i.e., random data, unreliable components. It is crucial
to evaluate the quantitive and qualitative analysis of the probability of the system properties.
Such analysis can be conducted by using probabilistic model checking. However, this method
is unfeasible to deal with large and complex systems and works directly with systems modeling
in SystemC, due to the state space explosion. In this paper, we demonstrate the successful use
of statistical model checking to carry out such analysis for systems modeled in SystemC. Our
verification framework allows designers to express a wide range of useful properties that can be
analyzed.
Key-words: Runtime Verification, Probabilistic Assertion, Statistical Model Checking, Program
Verification, SystemC
Dynamic Verification of SystemC with Statistical Model
Checking
Résumé : La modélisation au niveau transactionnel de SystemC a très bien réussi à décrire le
comportement des systèmes embarqués en fournissant de haut niveau des modèles exécutables,
dans laquelle beaucoup d’entre eux ont un comportement probabiliste inhérente, à savoir, des
données aléatoires, des composants fiables. Il est crucial pour évaluer l’analyse quantitative et
qualitative de la probabilité’ de les propriétés du système. Une telle analyse peut être effectuée à
l’aide de probabilistic model checking. Cependant, cette méthode est impossible de traiter avec
les systèmes vastes et complexes et travaille directement avec la modélisation des systèmes en
SystemC, en raison de l’espace explosion de l’état. Dans cet article, nous démontrons l’utilisation
réussie de statistical model checking à effectuer une telle analyse pour les systèmes modélisés dans
SystemC. Notre cadre de vérification permet aux concepteurs d’exprimer une large gamme de
propriétés utiles qui peuvent être analysés.
Mots-clés : Runtime Verification, Probabilistic Assertion, Statistical Model Checking, Pro-
gram Verification, SystemC
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1 Introduction
Transaction-level modeling (TLM) with SystemC has been become increasingly prominent in
describing the behavior of embedded systems [3], i.e., System-on-Chips (SoCs). It allows complex
electronic components and software control units can be combined into a single model, enabling
simulation of the whole system at once. In many cases, models include probabilistic and non-
deterministic characteristics, i.e, random data, reliability of the system’s components. It is crucial
to evaluate the quantitive and qualitative analysis of the probability of the system’s properties.
We consider a safety-critical system (i.e., the control system for air-traffic, automotive, and
medical device). The reliability and availability model of the system can be considered as a
stochastic process, in which it exhibits probabilistic characteristics. For instance, the reliability
and availability model of an embedded control system [15] that contains an input processor
connected to groups of sensors, an output processor, connected to groups of actuators, and a main
processor, that communicates with the I/O processors through a bus. Suppose that the sensors,
actuators, and processors can be failed, in which the I/O processors have transient and permanent
faults. When a transient fault occurs in a processor, rebooting the processor repairs the fault.
The times to failure and reboot’s delay of processors are exponentially distributed. Then, the
reliability of the system cam be modeled by a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) [25, 6]
that is a special case of a discrete-state stochastic process in which the probability distribution
of the next state depends only on the current state [25]. Hence, the analysis can be quantifying
the probability or rate of all safety-related faults: How likely the system is available to meet a
demand for service? What is the probability that the system repairs after a failure (e.g., the
system conforms to the existent and prominent standards such as the Safety Integrity Levels
(SILs))?
In order to conduct such analysis, a general approach is modeling and analyzing a proba-
bilistic model of the system (i.e, Markov chains, stochastic processes), in which the algorithm
for computing the measures in properties depends on the class of systems being considered and
the logic used for specifying the property. Many algorithms with the corresponding mature
tools are based on model checking techniques that compute the probability by a numerical ap-
proach [2, 4, 22, 10]. Timed automata with mature verification tools such as UPPAAL [16]
are used to verify real-time systems. For a variety of probabilistic systems, the most popular
modeling formalism is Markov chain or Markov decision processes, for which Probabilistic Model
Checking (PMC) tools such as PRISM [11] and MRMC [14] can be used. It is widely used and
has been successfully applied to the verification of a range of timed and probabilistic systems.
One of the main challenges is the complexity of the algorithms in terms of execution time and
memory space due to the size of the state space that tends to grow exponentially, also known as
the state space explosion. As a result, the analysis is infeasible. In addition, these tools cannot
work directly with the SystemC source code, meaning that a formal model of SystemC model
needs to be provided.
An alternative way to evaluate these systems is Statistical Model Checking (SMC), a simulation-
based approach. Simulation-based approaches produce an approximation of the value to evalu-
ate, based on a finite set of system’s executions. Clearly, comparing to the numerical approach,
a simulation-based solution does not provide an exact answer. However, users can tune the
statistical parameters such as the confidence interval and the confidence, according to the re-
quirements. Simulation-based approaches do not construct all the reachable states of the model-
under-verification (MUV), thus they require far less execution time and memory space than
numerical approaches. For some real-life systems, they are the only one option [28] and have
shown the advantages over other methods such as PMC [10, 13].
Our overall framework weaves the idea of statistical model checking to yield qualitative and
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quantitative analysis for the probability of a temporal property for SystemC models. The paper
makes the following contributions: (i) we propose a framework to verify bounded temporal
properties for SystemC models with both timed and probabilistic characteristics. The framework
contains two main components: a monitor that observes a set of execution traces of the MUV
and a statistical model checker implementing a set of hypothesis testing algorithms. We use
the similar techniques proposed by Tabakov et al. [24] to automatically generate the monitor.
The statistical model checker is implemented as a plugin of the checker Plasma Lab [1], in
which the properties to be verified are expressed in Bounded Linear Temporal Logic (BLTL); (ii)
we present a method that allows users to expose a rich set of user-code primitives in form of
atomic propositions in BLTL. These propositions help users exposing the state of the SystemC
simulation kernel and the full state of the SystemC source code model. In addition, users can
define their own fine-grained time resolution that is used to reason on the semantics of the logic
expressing the properties rather the boundary of clock cycles in the SystemC simulation; and
(iii) we demonstrate our approach through a running example, in which we showcase how our
SMC-based verification framework works. We also illustrate the performance of the framework
through some experiments.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 The SystemC Language
SystemC is a system-level design framework that can model both hardware and software com-
ponents. Complex electronic systems and control units can be combined into a single model, to
simulate and observe the behavior. In 2005 SystemC became standard as IEEE 1666-2005.
The design process can be parallel with SystemC since it allows blocks implemented at dif-
ferent abstraction levels to run together in the same model. Communication between modules
is specified using well-defined interfaces, which allows two modules that conform to the same
interface to be swapped seamlessly. Therefore, designers can try alternative approaches early in
the design process, before committing to a particular architecture.
SystemC is a library of C++ classes that means every SystemC model can be compiled with
standard C++ compiler and linked with SystemC library to produce an executable specifica-
tion. SystemC also provides an event-driven mechanisms for simulating parallel execution of the
model’s processes. The kernel borrows the delta-cycle concept from hardware design languages.
2.1.1 Time Model
In SystemC, integer values are used as discrete time model. The smallest quantum of time
that can be represented is called time resolution meaning that any time value smaller than the
time resolution will be rounded off. The available time resolutions are femtosecond, picosecond,
nanosecond, microsecond, millisecond, and second. SystemC provides functions to set time
resolution and declare a time object, for example, the following statements set the time resolution
to 10 picosecond and create a time object t1 representing 20 picoseconds:
1 sc_set_time_resolution (10, SC_PS);
2 sc_time t1(20,SC_PS);
2.1.2 Modules
A SystemC model is composed of modules, which define the behavior of the modeled systems.
Module data is inaccessible by the other modules of the system unless it is exposed explicitly.
Thus, modules can be developed independently and can be reused. The skeleton of a module is
given in Listing 1:
1 SC_MODULE(Name) {
2 // prots , processes , internal data , etc
3
4 SC_CTOR(Name) {
5 // Body of constructor ,
6 // Process declaration ,
7 // Sensitivities , etc.
8 }
9 };
Listing 1: Skeleton code of SystemC module
In general, a module contains:
• ports which are used to communicate with the environment;
• processes that represent the functionality of the module;
• local data and channels to represent the states of module and communication between
processes; and
Inria
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• hierarchically, other modules.
The SC_MODULE marco defines a class named Name and the SC_CTOR defines its constructor,
which maps designeated methods to processes and declares event sensitives. A module can be
instantiated which is similar to the instantiation of class. However, to instantiate a module the
user is required to suply a name to the instance. For example, to declare an instance of module
Name named “xy”, we state:
1 Name xy(‘‘xy’’);
2.1.3 Interfaces, Ports, and Channels
In hardware modeling languages, the hardware signal is used as the medium for communication
and synchronization between processes. The communication and synchronization are abstracted
in SystemC as interfaces, ports, and channels to provide the flexibility. Channels hold and
transmit data, and an interface is a “window” into a channel that describes the set of operations
of the channel. Ports are proxy objects that facilitate access to channels through interfaces.
An interface which is derived from the abstract base class sc_interface consists of a set of
operations by specifying their signatures. We consider a simple interface used with the hardware
signal: sc_signal_in_if<T> which is derived directly from sc_interface and is parameterized
by data-type T. It provides a virtual method read() that returns a constant reference to T.
A module uses its ports to connect to and communicate with its environment via a channel’s
interface. Ports can be considered as the pins of a hardware component. A channel has to
implement a port’s interface to connect to the port. Any specialized port is derived from the
port base class sc_port.
1 // N is number of channels that can be connected to the port
2 sc_port <if<ty >,N> p;
Here we declare a port p, which can access the number of N channels through the interface
if with type ty. SystemC provides the following predefined ports, called signal ports: sc_in,
sc_out, and sc_inout for input, output, and input-output ports. For example:
1 sc_in <int > a;
2 sc_out <int > b;
Here we define an input and an ouput ports named a and b, respectively, all of data type int.
A channel is an implementation of an interface by providing concrete definitions of all of the
interface’s operations. Thus, different channels may implement the same interface in different
ways. On other hand, a channel can implement more than one interface. Channels provode means
fo communication between modules and between processes within a module. The following are
several classes of channels in SystemC:
• A primitive channel does not contain any hierarchy or process and is derived from the
base class sc_prim_channel. SystemC contains several built-in channels: sc_signal,
sc_mutex, sc_semaphore, and sc_fifo.
• A hierarchical channel can have a structure, contain processes and access directly other
channels. All hiercarchical channels are derived from the base class sc_channel that is just
a redefinition of the class sc_module. Thus from a language point of view a hierarchical
channel is nothing but a module.
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2.1.4 Processes
Processes which provide the mechanism for simulating concurrent behavior are basic units of
functionality. A process must be contained in a module and declared to be a process in the
module’s constructor. There are two kinds of processes: method process (with macro SC_METHOD)
and thread process (with macro SC_THREAD).
When triggered, a method process always executes its body until the return. That means
it only returns the control to the kernel when it is at the end of its body. A thread process,
on the other hand, may have its execution suspended by calling the library function wait()
or any of its variants. All local variables and the point of suspension are saved. When the
execution is resummed, it will continue from that point, rather than from the beginning of the
process. Thus, unlike method processes, a thread process implicitly keeps its state of execution.
This feature makes thread process more expressive than method process, for example, by means
of wait statements multicycle behavior may be easily described by thread process, but would
require more effort with method process.
2.1.5 Events
An event is an object C++ of class sc_event, that determines whether and when a process’s
execution should be triggered or resumed. By default, SystemC defines for each sc_signal
an associated event value_changed_event(), that is notified whenever the value of the signal
is written or modified. The effect of the notification (by calling e.notify()) of e causes all
processes that are sensitive to it (or use wait(e)) to be triggered or resumed. The notification
can have different effects, depending on its argument:
• notify() without arguments makes immediate notification and puts all processes that are
sensitive to the event to the pool of runnable processes before the return of the function
call notify().
• notify() with arguments as zero time unit (e.g., SC_ZERO_TIME) delays the effect of the
event notification until all currently triggered processes have finished executing. The sim-
ulation clock does not advance during this delay. It is called delta-delayed notification.
• notify() with arguments as non-zero time units delays the effect of the notification by the
number of time units. The argument value is added to the simulation clock, and the event
is put in a queue. It is called time-delayed notification.
All event notifications are pending, they can be canceled, which removes any pending effect of the
event. A process can wait for an event in some bounded of time. For example, wait(2,SC_SEC,e)
resumes the execution after 2 seconds of simulation time if e is notified earlier.
2.1.6 Sensitivity
A module can be sensitive to events which is declared via the « operator as follows:
1 // special attribute of module named sensitive
2 sensitive << ‘‘event1 ’’ << ‘‘event2 ’’;
If the list of events remains the same throughout simulation, it is called a static sensitivity list.
Otherwise, it is a dynamic sensitivity list. That is, during simulation a thread process may
suspend itself and designate a specific event e as its current waiting event. Then, only this event
can resume the execution of the process (the static sensitivity list is ignored). A process can wait
for an event, composite events, or for a time:
Inria
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1 wait(e);
2 wait(e1 & e2 & e3);
3 wait(e1 | e2 | e3);
4 wait(10,SC_NS);
2.1.7 Simulation Kernel
The SystemC simulation kernel is an event-driven simulation. The structural information is
represented by the modules and ports. Only one thread is dispatched by the scheduler to run at
a time point, and the scheduler is non-preemptive, that is, the running process returns control
to the kernel only when it finishes executing or explicitly suspends itself by calling wait().
Like hardware modeling languages, the SystemC scheduler supports the notion of delta-cycles
[18]. A delta-cycle lasts for an infinitesimal amount of time and is used to impose a partial order
of simultaneous actions which interprets zero-delay semantics. Thus, the simulation time is
not advanced when the scheduler processes a delta-cycle. During a delta-cycle, the scheduler
executes actions in two phases: the evaluate and the update phases. The simulation semantics
of the SystemC scheduler is presented as follows:
1. Initialize. During the initialization, each process is executed once unless it is turned off by
calling dont_initialize(), or until a synchronization point (i.e., a wait) is reached. The
order in which these processes are executed is unspecified.
2. Evaluate. The kernel starts a delta-cycle and run all processes that are ready to run one
at a time. In this same phase a process can be made ready to run by an event notification.
3. Update. Execute any pending calls to update() resulting from calls to request_update()
in the evaluate phase. Note that a primitive channel uses request_update() to have the
kernel call its update() function after the execution of processes.
4. The kernel enters the delta notifcation phase where notified events trigger their dependent
processes. Note that immediate notifications may make new processes runable during step
2. If so the kernel loops back to step 2 and starts another evaluation phase and a new
delta-cycle. It does not advance simulation time.
5. If there are no more runable processes, the kernel advances simulation time to the earliest
pending timed notification. All processes sensitive to this event are triggered and the kernel
loops back to step 2 and starts a new delta-cycle. This process is finised when all processes
have terminated or the specified simulation time is passed.
The simulation semantics can be represented by the pseudo code in Listing 2.
1 PC // All primitive channels
2 P // All processes
3 R ← ∅ // Set of runnable processes
4 D ← ∅ // Set of pending delta notifications
5 U ← ∅ // Set of update requests
6 T ← ∅ // Set of pending timed notifications
7 // Start elaboration: collect all update requests in U
8 for all chan ∈ U do
9 run chan.update ()
10 end for
11 for all p ∈ P do
12 if p is initialized and p is not clocked thread then
13 R ← R ∪ p // Make p runnable
14 end if
15 end for
16 for all p ∈ P do
17 if p is triggered by an event in D then
18 R ← R ∪ p
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19 end if
20 end for // End of initialization phase
21
22 repeat
23 while R 6= ∅ do // New delta -cycle begins
24 for all r ∈ R do // Evaluation phase
25 R ← R \ r
26 run r until it calls wait() or returns
27 end for
28 for all chan ∈ U do // Update phase
29 run chan.update ()
30 end for
31 for all p ∈ P dp // Delta notification phase
32 if p is triggered by an event in D then
33 R ← R ∪ p // Make p runnable
34 end if
35 end for // End of delta -cycle
36 end while
37
38 if T 6= ∅ then
39 Advance the simulation clock to the earliest timed delay t
40 T ← T \ t
41 for all p ∈ P do // Timed notification phase
42 if t triggers p then
43 R ← R ∪ p // Make p runnable
44 end if
45 end for
46 end if
47 until end of simulation
Listing 2: Simulation Semantics of SystemC
2.2 Example: Producer-consumer Model
We will use a simple case study with a FIFO channel as a running example (see Figure 1 with the
graphical notations in [7]). This example shows the communication between modules throught a
Figure 1: Producer and consumer example
shared channel. The model consists of two modules Producer and Consumer that communicate
via a fixed length FIFO. It demonstrates how construct these modules and the communication
channel using sc_interface and sc_channel based classes. In this example, we will build a
simple channel for character writing and reading. Listing 3 shows a character interface definition.
We can see that our interfaces have to derived from the based class sc_interface and have only
pure virtual methods.
2.2.1 Interfaces
1 #ifndef FIFO_IF
2 #define FIFO_IF
3 #include <systemc.h>
4
5 class fifo_write_if : virtual public sc_interface {
6 public:
7 virtual void fifo_write(char) = 0;
8 virtual void fifo_reset () = 0;
9 };
10
11 class fifo_read_if : virtual public sc_interface {
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12 public:
13 virtual void fifo_read(char&) = 0;
14 virtual int fifo_num_available () = 0;
15 };
16
17 #endif
Listing 3: The fifo_if.h
2.2.2 Modules
The Producer writes a character to the FIFO with the probability of p1 ∈ [0, 1] and the Consumer
reads a character from the FIFO with the probability p2 ∈ [0, 1] for every nanosecond. We model
the probabilities of writing and reading with the Bernoulli distributions with probabilities p1
and p2 respectively from GNU Scientific Library (GSL) [8]. The following listings implement the
specification of the Producer and the Consumer.
1 #ifndef CONSUMER_H
2 #define CONSUMER_H
3
4 #include <systemc.h>
5 #include <tlm.h>
6 #include "fifo.cpp"
7 #include "utils.h"
8 #include <gsl/gsl_rng.h>
9 #include <gsl/gsl_randist.h>
10 #include <gsl/gsl_cdf.h>
11
12 SC_MODULE(Consumer) {
13 SC_HAS_PROCESS(Consumer);
14 public:
15 // Definitions of ports
16 sc_port <fifo_read_if > in; // input port
17 // Constructor
18 Consumer(sc_module_name name , int c_init , gsl_rng *rnd);
19 // Destructor
20 ~Consumer () {};
21 // Definition of processes
22 void main();
23 // Reading function
24 void receive(char &c);
25
26 private:
27 // Reading character in ASCII
28 int c_int;
29 gsl_rng *r;
30 };
31
32 #endif
Listing 4: The consumer.h
1 #include "consumer.h"
2
3 Consumer :: Consumer(sc_module_name name , int c_init , gsl_rng *rnd) {
4 c_int = c_init;
5 r = rnd; // random generator
6
7 SC_THREAD(main);
8 }
9
10 void Consumer :: receive(char &c) {
11 in->fifo_read(c);
12 c_int = c;
13 }
14
15 void Consumer ::main() {
16 char c;
17 while (true) {
18 // use the Bernoulli distribution in GSL
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19 int b = get_bernoulli(r ,0.90);
20 if (b) {
21 receive(c);
22 std::cout << c << "(" << sc_time_stamp () << ")";
23 }
24
25 wait(1,SC_NS); // waits for 1 nanosecond
26 }
27 }
Listing 5: The consumer.cpp
1 #ifndef PRODUCER_H
2 #define PRODUCER_H
3
4 #include <systemc.h>
5 #include <tlm.h>
6 #include "fifo.cpp"
7 #include "utils.h"
8 #include <gsl/gsl_rng.h>
9 #include <gsl/gsl_randist.h>
10 #include <gsl/gsl_cdf.h>
11
12 SC_MODULE(Producer) {
13 SC_HAS_PROCESS(Producer);
14 public:
15 // Definitions of ports
16 sc_port <fifo_write_if > out; // output port
17 // Constructor
18 Producer(sc_module_name name , int c_init , gsl_rng *rnd);
19 // Destructor
20 ~Producer () {};
21 // Definition of processes
22 void main();
23 // Writing function
24 void send(char c);
25
26 private:
27 int c_int;
28 gsl_rng *r;
29 };
30
31 #endif
Listing 6: The producer.h
1 #include "producer.h"
2
3 Producer :: Producer(sc_module_name name , int c_init , gsl_rng *rnd) {
4 c_int = c_init;
5 r = rnd; // random generator
6
7 SC_THREAD(main);
8 }
9
10 void Producer ::send(char c) {
11 out ->fifo_write(c);
12 c_int = c;
13 }
14
15 void Producer ::main() {
16 const char* str = "&abcdefgh@";
17 const char* p = str;
18 while (true) {
19 int b = get_bernoulli(r ,0.90);
20 if (b) {
21 send(*p);
22 p++;
23 if (!*p) {
24 p = str;
25 }
26 }
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27 wait(1,SC_NS); // waits for 1 nanosecond
28 }
29 }
Listing 7: The producer.cpp
The producer has one thread which runs infinitely to write a character into the FIFO that it
connects to via the output port using the interface fifo_write_if (line 16 in producer.h). The
producer’s process suspends itself explicitly by calling wait() (line 27 in producer.cpp). The
implementation of the consumer is in the similar way.
2.2.3 Channel
Now we implement the FIFO that is derived from fifo_write_if and fifo_read_if as in
Listing 8.
1 #ifndef BASE_CHANNEL_H
2 #define BASE_CHANNEL_H
3 #include <systemc.h>
4 #include "fifo_if.h"
5
6 class Fifo : public sc_channel , public fifo_write_if , public fifo_read_if {
7 private:
8 enum e {max = 10}; // capacity of the fifo
9 char data[max];
10 int num_elements , first;
11 sc_event write_event , read_event;
12
13 public:
14 Fifo(sc_module_name name) : sc_channel(name), num_elements (0), first (0) {}
15
16 void fifo_write(char c) {
17 if (num_elements == max) {
18 wait(read_event);
19 }
20
21 data[(first + num_elements) % max] = c;
22 ++ num_elements;
23 write_event.notify ();
24 }
25
26 void fifo_read(char &c) {
27 if (num_elements == 0) {
28 wait(write_event);
29 }
30
31 c = data[first];
32 --num_elements;
33 first = (first + 1) % max;
34 read_event.notify ();
35 }
36
37 void fifo_reset () {
38 num_elements = 0;
39 first = 0;
40 }
41
42 int fifo_num_available () {
43 return num_elements;
44 }
45 };
46
47 #endif
Listing 8: The fifo.cpp
Since the FIFO is bounded capacity meaning that it may be full when the producer tries to write
a character, or it may be empty when the consumer attempts to read a character. Thus, the
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implementation of the FIFO must handle this situation using the blocking read() and write()
operations. The channel fifo has the local variabels to store the available characters, the
positions of the next character to read and to write.
The read() operation first checks the number of available characters. If the fifo is empty,
the operation suspends execution with a call to wait(write_event) (line 28) and the execution
is resumed only when the write_event is notified. As soon as a character is read from the fifo,
the event read_event will be notified (line 34).
The write() operation is implemented similarly. It checks that whether the fifo is full or
not. If the fifo is full, the operation suspends execution with a call to wait(read_event) (line
18) and the execution is resumed only when the read_event is notified. As soon as a character
is writtend to the fifo, the event write_event will be notified (line 23).
The FIFO channel is designed to ensure that all data is reliably delivered despite the varying
rates of production and consumption. The channel uses an event notification hanshake protocol
for both the input and output. It uses a circular buffer implemented within a static array to store
and retrieve the items within the FIFO. We assume that the sizes of the messages and the FIFO
buffer are fixed. Hence, it is obvious that the time required to transfer completely a message, or
message latency, depends on the production and consumption rates, the FIFO buffer size, the
message size, and the probabilities of successful writing and reading.
2.2.4 Binding and Simulation
We now bind the modules of the producer and consumer with the fifo channel via the output
and input ports. One can write the binding code in a separated module or inside the sc_main()
function that is the entry of the executable SystemC model. The following listing presents an
example of binding and simulation of the producer-consumer model.
1 #include <time.h>
2 #include "fifo.cpp"
3 #include "consumer.h"
4 #include "producer.h"
5
6 #include <gsl/gsl_rng.h>
7 #include <gsl/gsl_randist.h>
8 #include <gsl/gsl_cdf.h>
9 // The monitor generated by MAG
10 #include "monitor.h"
11
12 int sc_main(int argc , char *argv []) {
13 // random generator in GSL
14 const gsl_rng_type *T;
15 gsl_rng *r;
16 gsl_rng_env_setup ();
17 T = gsl_rng_default;
18 r = gsl_rng_alloc(T);
19 // seed the generator
20 srand(time(NULL));
21 gsl_rng_set(r,random ());
22
23 sc_set_time_resolution (1,SC_NS); // time unit
24 Fifo afifo("fifo"); // create a channel fifo
25 Producer prod("producer",-1,r);
26 Consumer cons("consumer",-1,r);
27 prod.out(afifo); // the producer binding
28 cons.in(afifo); // the consumer binding
29 // the observer for Instrumented model
30 mon_observer* obs = local_observer :: createInstance (1,
31 &cons ,
32 &prod);
33 sc_start ();
34 gsl_rng_free (r); // release the generator
35 return 0;
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36 }
Listing 9: The main.cpp
If we compile and run the file main.cpp, some of the possible outputs of the model are given
as follows:
1 (&, 0) (a, 1) (b, 3) (c, 8) (d, 9)
2 (&, 4)
3 (&, 0) (a, 2) (b, 3) (c, 4) (d, 9)
Listing 10: Simulation Outputs
(x, i) means that the consumer reads a character “x” at the (i+ 1)th nanosecond.
2.3 Statistical Model Checking
We first recall the syntax and semantics of BLTL [23], an extension of Linear Temporal Logic
(LTL) with time bounds on temporal operators. A formula ϕ is defined over a set of atomic
propositions AP as in LTL. A BLTL formula is defined by the grammar ϕ ::= true|false|p ∈
AP |ϕ1 ∧ϕ2|¬ϕ|ϕ1 U≤T ϕ2, where the time bound T is an amount of time or a number of states
in the execution trace. The temporal modalities F (the “eventually”, sometimes in the future)
and G (the “always”, from now on forever) can be derived from the “until” U as follows.
F≤T ϕ = true U≤T ϕ and G≤T ϕ = ¬F≤T ¬ϕ
The semantics of BLTL is defined w.r.t execution traces of the modelM. Let
ω = (s0, t0)(s1, t1)...(sN−1, tN−1), N ∈ N
be an execution trace ofM, ωk and ωk be the prefix and suffix of ω respectively. We denote the
fact that ω satisfies the BLTL formula ϕ by ω |= ϕ.
• ωk |= true and ωk 6|= false
• ωk |= p, p ∈ AP iff p ∈ L(sk), where L(sk) is the set of atomic propositions which are true
in state sk
• ωk |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff ωk |= ϕ1 and ωk |= ϕ2
• ωk |= ¬ϕ iff ωk 6|= ϕ
• ωk |= ϕ1 U≤T ϕ2 iff there exists i ∈ N such that ωk+i |= ϕ2, Σ0<j≤i(tk+j − tk+j−1) ≤ T ,
and for each 0 ≤ j < i, ωk+j |= ϕ1
Let M be the formal model of the MUV (i.e., a stochastic process) and ϕ be a property
expressed as a BLTL formula. BLTL ensures that the satisfaction of a formula by a trace can
be decided in a finite number of steps. The statistical model checking [17] problem consists
in answering the following questions: (i) Is the probability that M satisfies ϕ greater or equal
to a threshold θ with a specific level of statistical confidence (qualitative analysis)? (ii) What
is the probability that M satisfies ϕ with a specific level of statistical confidence (quantitative
analysis)? They are denoted byM |= Pr(ϕ) andM |= Pr≥θ(ϕ), respectively. Many statistical
model checker are implemented [27, 1] that have shown their advantages over other methods
such as PMC on several case studies.
This is done by associating each execution trace of M with a discrete random Bernoulli
variable Bi, in which the outcome for Bi, denoted by bi, is 1 if the trace satisfies ϕ and 0 otherwise.
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The predominant statistical method for verifyingM |= Pr≥θ(ϕ) is based on hypothesis testing.
Let p = Pr(ϕ), to determine whether p ≥ θ, we test the hypothesis H0 : p ≥ p0 = θ + δ
against the alternative hypothesis H1 : p ≤ p1 = θ − δ based on the observations of Bi. The
size of indifference region is defined by p0 − p1. If we take acceptance of H0 to mean acceptance
of Pr≥θ(ϕ) as true and acceptance of H1 to mean rejection of Pr≥θ(ϕ) as false, then we can
use acceptance sampling (e.g., Younes in [26] has proposed two solutions, called single sampling
plan and sequential probability ratio test) to verify Pr≥θ(ϕ). An acceptance sampling test with
strength (α, β) guarantees that H1 is accepted with probability at most α when H0 holds and H0
is accepted with probability at most β when H1 holds, called a Type-I error and Type-II error,
respectively.
To answer the quantitative question, M |= Pr(ϕ), an alternative statistical method, based
on estimation instead of hypothesis testing, has been developed. For instance, the probability
estimations are based on results derived by Chernoff and Hoeffding bounds [12]. This approach
uses n observations b1, ..., bn to compute an approximation of p: p˜ = 1nΣ
n
i=1bi. The approximation
satisifies that Pr[|p˜ − p| < δ] ≥ 1 − α. Based on the theorem of Hoeffding, the number of
observations which is determined from the absolute error δ and the confidence 1 − α is n =
d 12δ2 log 2αe.
Although SMC can only provide approximate results with a user-specified level of statistical
confidence, it is compensated for by its better scalability and resource consumption. Since the
models to be analyzed are often approximately known, an approximate result in the analysis of
desired properties within specific bounds is quite acceptable. SMC has recently been applied in a
wide range of research areas including software engineering (e.g., verification of critical embedded
systems) [10], system biology, or medical area [13].
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3 SMC for SystemC Models
In order to apply SMC for SystemC models which exhibit probabilistic characteristics, this
section presents the definitions of state and execution trace of SystemC models. This section also
shows that the operational semantics of this class of SystemC models is considered as stochastic
processes.
3.1 SystemC Model State
Temporal logic formulas are interpreted over execution traces and traditionally a trace has been
defined as a sequence of states in the execution of a model. Therefore before we can define an
execution trace we need a precise definition of the state of a SystemC model simulation. We are
inspired by the definition of system state in [24], which consists of the state of the simulation
kernel and the state of the SystemC model. We consider the external libraries as black boxes,
meaning that their states are not exposed.
The state of the kernel contains the information about the current phase of the simulation
(i.e., delta-cycle notification, simulation-cycle simulation) and the SystemC events notified during
the execution of the model. The state of the SystemC model is the full state of the C++ code
of all modules in the model, which includes the values of the module attributes, the location of
the program counter (i.e., a particular statement is reached during the execution of the model,
the function calls), the call stack including the function execution, function parameters and
return values, and the status of the module processes (i.e., suppended, runnable). We use
V = {v0, ..., vn−1} to denote the finite set of variables of primitive type (e.g, usual scalar or
enumerated type in C/C++) whose value domain DX represents the states of a SystemC model.
We consider here some examples about states of the simulation kernel and the SystemC
model. Assume that a SystemC model has an event named e, then the model state can contain
information such as the kernel is at the end of simulation-cycle notification phase and the event
e is notified. Consider the running example again, a state can consist of the information about
the characters received by the consumer, represented by the variable c_read. It also contains
the information about the location of the program counter right before and after a call of the
function send() in the module Producer that are represented by two Boolean variables send_start
and send_done, respectively, meaning that they hold the value true immediately before and
after a call of the function send(). Another example, we consider a module that consists several
statements at different locations in the source code, in which these statements contain the devision
operator “/” followed by zero or more spaces and the variable “a” (e.g., the statement y = (x +
1) / a). Then, a Boolean variable which holds the value true right before the execution of all
such statements can be used as a part of the states.
We have discussed so far the state of a SystemC model execution. It remains to discuss how
the semantics of the temporal operators is interpreted over the states in the execution of the
model. That means how the states are sampled in order to make the transition from one state
to another state. The following definition gives the concept of temporal resolution, in which the
states are evaluated only at instances in which the temporal resolution holds. It allows the user
to set granularity of time.
Temporal resolution A temporal resolution Tr is a finite set of Boolean expressions defined
over V which specifies when the set of variables V is evaluated.
Temporal resolution can be used to define a more fine-grained model of time than a coarse-
grained one provided by a cycle-based simulation. We call the expressions in Tr temporal events.
Whenever a temporal event is satisfied or the temporal event occurs, V is sampled. For example,
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in the producer and consumer model, assume that we want the satisfaction of the underlying
BLTL ϕ to be checked whenever at the end of simulation-cycle notification or immediately after
the event write_event is notified during a run of the model. Hence, we can define a temporal
resolution as the following set Tr = {end_sc, we_notified}, where end_sc and we_notified are
Boolean expressions that have the value true whenever the kernel phase is at the end of the
simulation-cycle notification and the event write_event notified, respectively.
We denote the set of occurrences of temporal events from Tr along an execution of a SystemC
model by T sr , called a temporal resolution set. The value of a variable v ∈ V at an event
occurrence ec ∈ T sr is defined by a mapping ξvval : T sr → Dv, where Dv is the value domain of v.
Hence, the state of the SystemC model at ec is defined by a tuple (ξv0val, ..., ξ
vn−1
val ).
A mapping ξt : T sr → T is called a time event that identifies the simulation time at each
occurrence of an event from the temporal resolution. Hence, the set of time points, called time
tag, which corresponds to a temporal resolution set T sr = {ec0 , ..., ecN−1}, N ∈ N, is given as
follows.
Time tag Given a temporal resolution set T sr , the time tag T corresponding to T sr is a finite
or infinite set of non-negative reals {t0, t1, ..., tN−1}, where ti+1 − ti = δti ∈ R≥0, ti = ξt(eci).
3.2 Model and Execution Trace
A SystemC model can be viewed as a hierarchical network of parallel communicating processes.
Hence, the execution of a SystemC model is an alternation of the control between the model’s
processes, the external libraries and the kernel process. The execution of the processes is super-
vised by the kernel process to concurrently update new values for the signals and variables w.r.t
the cycle-based simulation. For example, given a set of runnable processes in a simulation-cycle,
the kernel chooses one of them to execute first in a non-deterministic manner as described in the
prior section.
Let V be the set of variables whose values represent the states of a SystemC model. The
values of variables in V are determined by a given probability distribution (i.e., production
from all probability distributions used in the model). Given a temporal resolution Tr and its
corresponding temporal resolution set along an execution of the model T sr = {ec0 , ..., ecN−1}, N ∈
N, the evaluation of V at the event occurrence eci is defined by the tuple (ξ
v0
val, ..., ξ
vn−1
val ), or a
state of the model at eci , denoted by V (eci) = (V (eci)(v0), V (eci)(v1), ..., V (eci)(vn−1)), where
V (eci)(vk) = ξ
vk
val(eci) with k = 0, ..., n−1 is the value of the variable vk at eci . We denote the set
of all possible evaluations by VT sr ⊆ DV , called the state space of the random variables in V . State
changes are observed only at the moments of event occurrences. Hence, the operational semantics
of a SystemC model is represented by a stochastic process {(V (eci), ξt(eci)), eci ∈ T sr }i∈N, taking
values in VT sr × R≥0 and indexed by the parameter eci , which are event occurrences in the
temporal resolution set T sr . An execution trace is a realization of the stochastic process is given
as follows.
Execution trace An execution trace of a SystemC model corresponding to a temporal resolu-
tion set T sr = {ec0 , ..., ecN−1}, N ∈ N is a sequence of states and event occurrence times, denoted
by ω = (s0, t0)...(sN−1, tN−1), such that for each i ∈ 0, ..., N − 1, si = V (eci) and ti = ξt(eci).
N is the length (finite or infinite) of the execution, also denoted by |ω|. Let V ′ ⊆ V , the
projection of ω on V ′, denoted by ω ↓V ′ , is an execution trace such that |ω ↓V ′ | = |ω| and
∀v ∈ V ′, ∀ec ∈ T sr , V ′(ec)(v) = V (ec)(v).
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3.3 Expressing Properties
Our approach allows users to refer to a rich set of atomic propositions AP which is defined
over the set of variables V as previously mentioned. These propositions abstract the states of a
SystemC model and evaluate to either true or false in such a state. The implementation provides
a mechanism that allows users to declare V in order to define the set of propositions AP without
requiring users to write the monitoring code or to write aspect-oriented programming advices
manually.
Users declare these variables via a high-level language in a configuration file as the input of
our tool. For instance, refering to the producer and consumer model, the declaration location
send_start “%Producer::send()”:call declares a Boolean variable send_start that holds the value
true immediately before the execution of the model reaches a call site of the function send() in the
module Producer. The characters received by the consumer which is represented by the variable
c_read can be declared as attribute pnt_con→c_int c_read, where pnt_con is a pointer to the
Consumer object and c_int is an attribute of the Consumer moudle representing the received
character. The detailed syntax can be found in the tool manual1.
AP are predicates defined over the set of variables V . Using these predicates, users can
define temporal properties related to the states of the kernel and the SystemC model. Recall the
considered property of the running example, the predicates which are defined over the variable
c_read are c_read =′ &′ and c_read =′ @′. Another example, assume that we want to answer
the following question: “Over a period of T time units, is the probability that the number of
elements in the FIFO buffer in between n1 and n2 is greater or equal to θ with the confidence
α?”. The predicates need to be defined in order to construct the underlying BLTL formula are
n1 ≤ nelements and nelements ≤ n2, where nelements is an integer variable that represents the
current number of elements in the FIFO buffer (it capptures the value of the num_elements
attribute in the Fifo module). Then, the property can be translated in BLTL with the operator
“always” as follows. The input which is given to the checker is Pr≥θ(ϕ) along with the confidence
α.
ϕ = G≤T ((n1 ≤ nelements) & (nelements ≤ n2))
1https://project.inria.fr/plasma-lab/documentation/tutorial/mag_manual/
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4 Implementation
We have implemented a SMC-based verification tool that contains two main components: a
monitor and aspect-advice generator (MAG) and a statistical model checker (SystemC Plugin).
The tool whose flow is depicted in Figure 2 can be considered as a static runtime verification
tool for probabilistic temporal properties.
4.1 MAG and SystemC Plugin
In principle, the full state can be observed during the simulation of the model. In practice,
however, users define a set of variables of interest, according to the properties that the users
want to verify, called observed variables, and only these variables appear in the states of an
execution trace. Given a SystemC model, we use Vobs ⊆ V to denote the set of variables, called
Figure 2: The framework’s flow
observed variables, to expose the states of the SystemC model. Then, the observed execution
traces of the model are the projections of the execution traces on Vobs, meaning that for every
execution trace ω, the corresponding observed execution trace is ω ↓Vobs . In the following, when
we mention about execution traces, we mean observed execution traces.
The implementation of MAG allows users to define a set of observed variables that is used
with a temporal resolution to generate a monitor. The implementation based on the techniques
in [24], in which a monitor and an aspect-advice file are generated in order to automatically
instrument the SystemC model with the help of AspectC++ [5] and establish a communication
between the generated monitor and the instrumented model. The monitor evaluates the set of
observed variables at every time point at which an event of the temporal resolution occurs during
the SystemC model simulation to produce a new state.
For example, the variable c_read which observes the received character by the consumer (the
private attribute c_int in the module Consumer) at the end of simulation-cycle notification, is
implemented by generating a monitor and instrumenting the module Consumer to establish a
communication between them as follows. The module Consumer is instrunmented with As-
pectC++, in this case, such that the monitor is its friend class, so the monitor can access the
private attributes of Consumer. The monitor defines a callback function being called immediately
at the end of simulation-cycle notification, and a pointer pointing to an instance of Consumer.
The execution of the callback function consists of getting the current value of the received char-
acter by the consumer, assigning this character to c_read, and executing the monitor one step
(i.e., creating a new state and reporting it to the Plasma plugin). In case temporal resolutions
defined by using the kernel simulation phases or the event notification, the calling mechanism of
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the callback function is realized by modification the kernel (i.e., at the end of simulation-cycle
segment code, a call to the callback function is added).
The statistical model checker is implemented as a plugin of Plasma Lab [1] that establishes
a communication, in which the generated monitor transmits execution traces of the MUV. In
the current version, the communication is done via the standard input and output. When a new
state is requested, the monitor reports the current state (the values of variables in Vobs) to the
plugin. The length of traces depends on the satisfaction of the formula to be verified, which is
finite because the temporal operators are bounded. Similarly, the required number of execution
traces depends on the hypothesis testing algorithms in use (e.g., sequential hypothesis testing or
2-sided Chernoff bound). The full implementation can be downloaded on the website of Plasma
Lab2.
4.2 Running Verification
Running the verification tool consists of two steps as follows. First, users define a set of observed
variables and a temporal resolution in a configuration file, as well as other necessary information
as an input for MAG to generate a monitor and an aspect-advices file. AspectC++ then is used
to instrument automatically the model. The instrumented model and the generated monitor are
compiled and linked together with the SystemC kernel into an executable model in order to make
a set of execution traces.
Refering to the running example, users will define the set of observed variables Vobs =
{c_read, nelements, end_sc}, where c_read is the character read in the FIFO, nelements is the
number of characters in the FIFO buffer, and end_sc is true whenever the kernel phase is at the
end of the simulation-cycle notification phase. The temporal resolution will be defined as Tr =
{end_sc}, meaning that a new state in execution traces is produced whenever the simulation
kernel is at the end of simulation-cycle notification phase or every one nanosecond in the example
since the time unit is one nanosecond. The full configuration is given as follows.
1 # Where to output the monitor
2 output_file ./ monitor.cpp
3
4 # The (class) name of the generated monitors
5 mon_name monitor
6
7 # Plasma project file
8 plasma_file /PLASMA_Lab -1.3.0/ fifo/fifo.plasma
9
10 # Plasma project name
11 plasma_project_name fifo
12
13 # Plasma model name
14 plasma_model_name fifo_model
15
16 # Instrumented executable SystemC model
17 plasma_model_content /PLASMA_Lab -1.3.0/ fifo/fifo
18
19 # Set to write traces to a file
20 write_to_file false
21
22 # Declare monitors as friend to adder class
23 usertype Consumer
24 usertype Producer
25
26 # Example of how to declare type of non -native variables
27 type Consumer *pnt_con
28 type Producer *pnt_pro
29
30 # Module attributes
31 attribute pnt_con ->c_int c_read
2https://project.inria.fr/plasma-lab/download/plugins/
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32 attribute pnt_pro ->c_int c_write
33
34 # Attribute type
35 att_type int c_read
36 att_type int c_write
37 att_type int n_elements
38
39 # Time resolution
40 time_resolution MON_TIMED_NOTIFY_PHASE_END
41
42 # Properties
43 formula G <=#10000(( c_read = 38) => (F <=#15( c_read = 64)))
44
45 # Includes the files
46 include consumer.h
47 include producer.h
Listing 11: The configuration file for MAG
In the second step, the plugin is used to verify the properties of interest. The satisfaction
checking of the properties is brought out based on the set of execution traces by executing the
instrumented SystemC model and can be done by several hypothesis testing algorithms provided
by Plasma Lab.
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5 Experimental Evaluation
We report the experimental results for the running example and also demonstrate the use of our
verification tool to analyze the dependability of a large embedded control system. The number
of components in this system makes numerical approaches such as PMC unfeasible. In both
case studies, we used the 2-sided Chernoff bound algorithm with the absolute error  = 0.02
and the confidence α = 0.98. The experiments were run on machine with Intel Core i7 2.67
GHz processor and 4GB RAM under the Linux OS with SystemC 2.3.0, in which the checking
of the properties in the running example took from less than one minute to several minutes.
The analysis of the embedded and control system case study takes almost 2 hours, in which 90
properties were verified.
5.1 Producer and Consumer
Let us go back to the running example in Section ??, recall that we want to compute the
probability that the following property ϕ satisfies every 1 nanosecond, with the absolute error
0.02 and the level of confidence 0.98. In this verification, both the FIFO buffer size and message
size are 10 characters including the starting and ending delimiters, and the production and
consumption rates are 1 nanosecond.
ϕ = G≤T ((c_read = ′&′)→ F≤T1(c_read = ′@′))
First, we check this property with the various values of p1 and p2. The results are given in
Table 1 with T = 5000 and T1 = 25 nanoseconds. It is trivial that the probability that the
message latency is smaller than T1 time increases when p1 and p2 increase. That means that,
in general, the latency is shorter when the either the probability that the producer successfully
writes to the FIFO increases, or the probability that the consumer successfully reads from the
FIFO increases.
p1\p2 0.3 0.6 0.9
0.6 0 0.0194 0.0720
0.9 0 0.0835 1
Table 1: The probability that the message latency is smaller than 25 in the first 5000 nanoseconds
of operation
Second, we compute the probability that a message is sent completely (or the message latency)
from the producer to the consumer within T1 time over a period of T time of operation, in which
the probabilities p1 and p2 are fixed at 0.9. Fig. 3 shows this probability with different values of
T1 over T = 10000 nanoseconds. It is observed that the message latency is almost smaller than
18 nanoseconds.
5.2 An Embedded Control System
This case study is closely based on the one presented in [21, 15] but contains much more com-
ponents. The system consists of an input processor (I) connected to 50 groups of 3 sensors, an
output processor (O), connected to 30 groups of 2 actuators, and a main processor (M), that
communicates with I and O through a bus. At every cycle, 1 minute, the main processor polls
data from the input processor that reads and processes data from the sensor groups. Based on
this data, the main processor constructs commands to be passed to the output processor for
controlling the actuator groups.
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Figure 3: The probability that the message latency is smaller than T1 in the first T nanoseconds
of operation
The reliability of the system is affected by the failures of the sensors, actuators, and processors.
The probability of bus failure is negligible, hence we do not consider it. The sensors and actuators
are used in 37− of− 50 and 27− of− 30 modular redundancies, respectively. That means if at
least 37 sensor groups are functional (a sensor group is functional if at least 2 of the 3 sensors are
functional), the system obtains enough information to function properly. Otherwise, the main
processor is reported to shut the system down. In the same way, the system requires at least 27
functional actuator groups to function properly (a actuator group is functional if at least 1 of
the 2 actuators is functional). Transient and permanent faults can occur in processors I or O
and prevent the main processor(M) to read data from I or send commands to O. In that case,
M skips the current cycle. If the number of continuously skipped cycles exceeds the limit K,
the processor M shuts the system down. When a transient fault occurs in a processor, rebooting
the processor repairs the fault. Lastly, if the main processor fails, the system is automatically
shut down. The mean times to failure for the sensors, the actuators, and the processors are 1
month, 2 months and 1 year, respectively. The mean time to transient failure is 1 day and I/O
processors take 30 seconds, 1 time unit, to reboot.
The reliability of the system is modeled as a CTMC [20, 25, 6] that is realized in SystemC, in
which a sensor group has 4 states (0, 1, 2, 3, the number of working sensors), 3 states (0, 1, 2, the
number of working actuators) for an actuator group, 2 states for the main processor (0: failure,
1: functional), and 3 states for I/O processors (0: failure, 1: transient failure, 2: functional). A
state of the CTMC is represented as a tuple of the component’s states, and the mean times to
failure define the delay before which a transition between states is enabled. The delay is sampled
from a negative exponential distribution with parameter equal to the corresponding mean time
to failure. Hence, the model has about 2155 states comparing to the model in [15] with about 210
states, that makes the PMC technique is unfeasible. That means the state explosion likely occurs,
even with some abstraction, i.e., symbolic model checking is applied. The full implementation of
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the SystemC code of this case study can be obtained at the website of our tool3.
We define four types of failures: failure1 is the failure of the sensors, failure2 is the failure of
the actuators, failure3 is the failure of the I/O processors and failure4 is the failure of the main
processor. For example, failure1 is defined by number_sensors < 37)∧ (proci_status = 2). It
specifies that the number of working sensor groups has decreased below 37 and the input processor
is functional, so that it can report the failure to the main processor. We define failure2, failure3,
and failure4 in a similar way.
In our analysis which is based on the one in [15] with K = 4, in which the properties
are checked every 1 time unit. First, we try to determine which kind of component is more
likely to cause the failure of the system, meaning that we determine the probability that a
failure related to a given component occurs before any other failures. The atomic proposition
shutdown =
∨4
i=1 failurei indicates that the system has shut down because one of the failures
has occurred, and the BLTL formula ¬shutdown U≤T failurei states that the failure i occurs
within T time units and no other failures have occurred before the failure i occurs. Fig. 4 shows
the probability that each kind of failure occurs first over a period of 30 days of operation. It is
obvious that the sensors are likelier to cause a system shutdown. At T = 20 days, it seems that
we reached a stationary distribution indicating for each kind of component the probability that
it is responsible for the failure of the system.
Figure 4: The probability that each of the 4 failure types is the cause of system shutdown in the
first T time of operation
For the second part of our analysis, we divide the states of system into three classes: “up”,
where every component is functional, “danger”, where a failure has occurred but the system
has not yet shut down (e.g., the I/O processors have just had a transient failure but they have
rebooted in time), and “shutdown”, where the system has shut down [15]. We aim to compute
the expected time spent in each class of states by the system over a period of T time units.
To this end, we add in the model, for each class of state c, a random variable reward_c that
measures the time spent in the class c. In our tool, the formula X≤T reward_c returns the mean
3https://project.inria.fr/plasma-lab/embedded-control-system/
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value of reward_c after T time of execution. The results are plotted in Fig. 5. From T = 20
days, it seems that the amounts of time spent in the “up” and “danger” states are converged at
101.063 = 11.57 days and 10−1.967 = 0.01 days, respectively. Due to the lack of space, we present
the other parts of the analysis in Appendix B. We also study the probability that each of the four
Figure 5: The expected amount of time spent in each of the states: “up”, “danger” and “shutdown”
types of failure eventually occurs in the first T time of operation. This is done using the BLTL
formula F≤T (failurei). Figure 6 plots these probabilities over the first 30 days of operation.
We observe that the probabilities that the sensors and I/O processors eventually fail are more
than the others do. In the long run, they are almost the same and approximate to 1, meaning
that the sensors and I/O processors will eventually fail with probability 1. The main processor
has the smallest probability to eventually fail.
Finally, we approximate the number of reboots of the I/O processors, and the number sensor
groups, actuator groups that are functional over time by computing the expected values of random
variables that count the number of reboots, functional sensor and actuator groups. The results
are plotted in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8. It is obvious that the number of reboots of both processors
doubles the number of reboots of each processor since they have the same behavior.
Inria
Dynamic Verification of SystemC with Statistical Model Checking 27
Figure 6: The probability that each of the 4 failure types in the first T time of operation
Figure 7: Expected number of reboots that occur in the first T time of operation
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Figure 8: Expected number of functional sensor and actuator groups in the first T time of
operation
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6 Conclusions
There has been a lot of work on the formalization of SystemC [9, 19]. The goal is to extract
a formal model from a SystemC program, so that tools like model-checkers can be applied.
However, all these formalizations consider semantics of SystemC and its simulator in some form
of global model, and they also suffer from the state space explosion when dealing with industrial
and large systems.
Tabakov et al. [24] proposed a framework for monitoring temporal SystemC properties. This
framework allows users express the verifying properties by fully exposing the semantics of the
simulator as well as the user-code. They extend LTL by providing some extra primitives for
stating the atomic propositions and let users define a much finer temporal resolution. Their
implementation consists of a modified simulation kernel, and a tool to automatically generate the
monitors and aspect advices for applying Aspect Oriented Programming (AOP) [5] to instrument
SystemC programs automatically.
This paper presents the first attempt to verify non-trivial temporal properties of SystemC
model with statistical model checking techniques. The framework contains two main components:
a generator that automatically generates a monitor and instruments the MUV based on the
properties to be verified, and a statistical model checker implementing a set of hypothesis testing
algorithms. In comparison to the probabilistic model checking, our approach allows users to
handle large industrial systems, expose a rich set of user-code primitives in form of atomic
propositions in BLTL, and work directly with SystemC models. For instance, our verification
framework is used to analyze the dependability of large industrial computer-based control systems
as shown in the case study.
Currently, we consider an external library as a “black box”, meaning that we do not consider
the states of external libraries. Thus, arguments passed to a function in an external library
cannot be monitored. For future work, we would like to allow users to monitor the states of the
external libraries. We also plan to apply statistical model checking to verify temporal properties
of SystemC-AMS (Analog/Mixed-Signal).
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